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Abstract 
This  note  examines  Thomas  Piketty’s  (2014)  explanation  and  prediction  of 
simultaneously rising capital income ratio and profit share by an elasticity of 
substitution,  σ,  greater  than  one  between  labor  and  capital  in  an  aggregate 
production function.  I review Piketty’s elasticity argument, which relies on a 
non-standard capital definition.  In light of the theory of land rent,  I discuss 
why the non-standard capital definition is a measure of wealth, not capital and 
is problematic for estimating elasticities.  I present simple long-run estimates 
of  σ  in  the  class  of  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  functions  for  Piketty’s 
data  as  well  as  for  a  subset  of  his  capital  measure  that  comes  closer  to  the 
standard  definition  of  productive  capital.  The  estimation  results  cast  doubt 
on Piketty’s hypothesis of a σ  greater than one. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In our view, it is natural to imagine that [the elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital in a two-factor, one-commodity neoclassical 
growth model of the economies of ‘rich countries’] was possibly much less 
than 1 in the 18th-19th centuries and became significantly larger than 1 in 
the 20th-21st centuries. One expects a higher elasticity of substitution in 
more diversified economies where capital can take many forms. (Piketty 
and Zucman 2013, p. 36 – all page numbers refer to their working paper 
version not the QJE version) 
 
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) explains the 
simultaneously rising capital-income ratio and profit share that he observes in his 
dataset with an elasticity of substitution greater than one between labor and capital 
in an aggregate production function.1 This allows him to link the rise in the amount 
of capital directly to functional inequality – the inequality between wage earners 
and those that earn returns on capital. Piketty deserves great credit for fueling the 
debate about the pressing issues of income and wealth inequality. But his inequality 
argument based on a high elasticity of substitution has a problem. Previous estimates 
of the aggregate elasticity have tended to be below one (Chirinko 2008, L´ eon Ledesma 
et al. 2010). 
Piketty goes against this evidence because he uses a non-standard definition of 
 
 
1An elasticity of substitution above one implies that an increase in one input factor’s quantity 
relative to the other input factors into production, leads to a rise in this increased input factor’s 
share in output.  Then a rising capital relative to labor input increases the capital share. 
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capital. In his view, the amount of capital equals ‘all non-human assets’ existing 
in the economy, whether used for production or not. This includes housing, land 
and other natural, non-produced assets, valued at their (financial) market price 
or imputed price.  It contrasts with the standard definition of capital as produced 
commodities required for production (Hennings 1990), in that it includes both non-produced 
assets, such as land used for agriculture, and produced assets not themselves used 
in production, such as residential houses.2  And indeed, a considerable part of his 
measure of capital is the sum of the market prices of residential property consisting of 
both non-produced land and the houses on it that are no input into any production 
process.3 Although economists exclude residential property from measures of the 
capital stock in production, when they estimate the parameters of production functions 
(for instance Antras 2004), Piketty includes it. To better distinguish Piketty’s from 
the usual notion of capital, I will call Piketty’s non-human assets ‘wealth’, and the 
stock of produced assets from cumulated investment expenditures ‘productive capital’ 
in this article. 
This financial wealth measure, when used instead of productive capital, may bias 
the elasticity of substitution upwards. Below, I will make this argument theoretically 
based on the concept of land rent. But it is also intuitively obvious. It is nowhere 
better illustrated than with the subprime housing bubble in the US, where the 
2Production is here narrowly defined as production in firms and government through its direct 
inputs. It excludes the great amount of unpaid labor expended in the household and elsewhere on 
the reproduction of the labor force. 
3National accounting rules add to the confusion by imputing a rental income to owner-occupiers 
of houses in order to ensure national income comparability between countries with commercial 
rental markets of varying importance. Thus, within this accounting framework, houses produce 
‘housing services’ (United Nations et al. 2009, p. 99). 
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value of houses rose considerably before dropping in the 2008 financial crisis. These 
fluctuations in house prices had no (direct) impact on the stock of productive capital 
available for production. Hence, wealth fluctuated more over time than productive 
capital. But since the elasticity of substitution is greater the more the capital stock 
changes relative to a given change in the rate of return, the elasticity of substitution 
calculated based on wealth is in that case bigger than that calculated based on 
productive capital.4 It is not clear how big because Piketty appears not to report 
quantitative estimation results. From inspection of the data, however, he mentions 
a range of 1.3 to 1.6 for the elasticity of substitution between wealth and labor 
in present times high income economies (Piketty 2014, p. 221). Any value above 
one allows him to explain the simultaneous increase in the wealth-income ratio and 
wealth share with neoclassical growth theory. Since, as Robert Rowthorn (2014) 
points out, the high value of the elasticity is the pivot on which Piketty’s theory of 
the rising wealth share in income hinges, it is interesting to understand the argument 
and data better. 
In this paper I will review Piketty’s elasticity argument and then discuss it 
critically in light of his non-standard capital definition by drawing on insights from 
the theory of land rent. Then, assuming a neoclassical production function as Piketty 
does, I will make a simple quantitative estimate of the elasticity of substitution for 
the data used by Piketty as well as for a subset of his wealth measure that comes 
closer to the definition of productive capital. The estimation results cast doubt on 
the hypothesis of an elasticity of substitution greater than one even for   Piketty’s 
4See James Galbraith (2014a) on the problem of using a financial measure of capital and Gal- 
braith (2014b) on how the valuation of financial assets influences Piketty’s accounting. 
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idiosyncratic capital definition. 
 
 
2 Piketty’s Elasticity Argument 
 
Piketty’s (2014) discussion of the elasticity of substitution is based on the paper 
by Piketty and Gabriel Zucman (2013).5 In Section 7 of Piketty and Zucman they 
observe that both the wealth/income ratio, W/X or β in their notation, and the 
wealth share in income, α, have risen in high income countries, while the rate of 
return on wealth, r = α/β, has fallen slightly.6 Then they write (recalling that what 
they call capital, I call wealth here) 
 
Of course, this decline [in r] is what one would expect in any model: when 
there is more capital, the rate of return to capital must go down. The 
interesting question is whether it falls more or less than the quantity of 
capital. According to our data it has fallen less, implying a rising capital 
share. (ibid. p. 34) 
They must mean whether the rate of return falls more than proportionally to the 
rise in the wealth-output ratio, β, since α = rβ. 
Operating in a neoclassical model of growth, they then assert that this observation 
can be explained by a two factor, one commodity production function, with the 
peculiar input factor of what I call here wealth – which Piketty of course conflates 
with capital. The only additional restriction on the model is an elasticity of substitution 
5Now published in abbreviated form in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
6Their data appendix includes files on eight countries: Australia, Japan, Canada, USA, France, 
Germany, Italy and UK. 
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greater than one, which implies precisely that a rise in wealth leads to an increase 
in its share in output. This is because it can be substituted for labor so well, i.e. the 
additional units of wealth ‘in production’ lead to almost as much additional output 
per unit wealth as for the previously existing units of wealth (what economists would 
call the marginal product of wealth.) Since by assumption the rate of return on 
wealth equals its marginal product, the additional units of wealth add more to the 
income of wealth owners than the diminished return per unit wealth reduces it and 
the total remuneration of wealth owners increases relative to that of labor.7 
Piketty and Zucman highlight that their explanation is more parsimonious than 
alternative models with imperfect competition or with three input factors: skilled 
and unskilled labor and wealth (ibid. p. 35). Stressing that their ‘discussion of 
capital shares and production functions should be viewed as merely exploratory and 
illustrative’ (p. 36) they nevertheless predict that it is likely that α will rise to 
above 40% because of a strong growth in β as it returns to its value of the 18-19th 
centuries combined with an elasticity of substitution greater than one. Accepting for 
the present analysis the theoretical assumptions advanced by Piketty and Zucman 
except their non-standard definition of capital, I will discuss how this non-standard 
definition may impact the elasticity of substitution between labor and the so-defined 
capital. 
7Of course it should be kept in mind that Piketty and Zucman’s notion of wealth as an input into 
production is inconsistent also with the neoclassical notion of capital (Garbellini and Wirkierman 
2014). 
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3 The Definition of Capital 
 
An elasticity greater one between input factors into production stands in contrast 
with most previous empirical work, but is likely an artifact of a non-standard definition 
of capital. Piketty and Zucman prefer their all non-human asset definition for capital 
because it is consistent with balance sheet estimates of wealth (2013, p. 6–7), because 
housing assets make up half of national wealth and some housing may be used for 
business purposes (ibid. p. 12 fn. 17) and because it ‘is precisely what the economists 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth century aimed to capture.’ (ibid. p. 7, my emphasis) 
In particular, according to them the lack of balance sheet data was a major reason 
why economists from Cambridge, U.K., took issue with the production function used 
by the Cambridge, Massachusetts, economists in the so-called Cambridge capital 
controversies. With the new data they presumably would not do so.8 Piketty and 
Zucman believe that the non-standard definition of capital ‘is a useful, meaning- 
ful,  and well-defined starting point’  (ibid.) for analyzing models of growth  and 
distribution and the elasticity of substitution, even though it represents wealth, not 
productive capital. 
 
3.1 Empirical differences 
 
In how far is the empirical evolution of the wealth-income ratio different from the 
productive  capital-income  ratio? Stefan Homburg (2014) shows for France  that 
8Piketty and Zucman do not explain how exactly this would have resolved the debate. Galbraith 
(2014a) discusses problems with Piketty’s (2014) depiction of that debate; for an account of how the 
debate went see Harcourt (1972) and, for a opposing view, Stiglitz (1974). More recent discussions 
can be found in Cohen and Harcourt (2003) and Pasinetti (2003). 
9 
This is the accepted version of the article accepted for publication in Review of Political Economy published by Taylor & 
Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crpe20  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23341/  
 
 
it is thanks to the non-standard definition that Piketty’s wealth-income ratio is 
increasing. The revaluation of land and real estate, but not the accumulated capital 
used in production grew at a faster rate than income. In other words, while Piketty’s 
wealth has increased more than proportionally with income, productive capital has 
increased proportionally with income in France, in accordance with the fourth of the 
Kaldor (1961) stylized facts. 
Figure 1 shows that taking out the real estate and foreign capital parts of Piketty’s 
measure of wealth that is represented by dashed lines, the remaining ‘other domestic 
capital’ series that is represented by solid lines has no or much less upward trend 
for the eight countries for which Piketty provides data. ‘Other domestic capital’ is a 
financial valuation, too, and subject to revaluation that may have little to do with 
a change in value at cost of the underlying capital. But it approximates productive 
capital better by excluding residential housing that is not used for production, and 
the non-produced land it stands on. The time series confirm that the changes in the 
wealth-income ratio are larger than those in the other domestic capital-income ratio. 
 
3.2 The Theory of Land Rent 
 
The theoretical support for wealth as a monolithic input into production is questionable. 
It is curious that Piketty calls on the 18th-19th century political economists of 
the English classical school to back up his argument of subsuming all assets that 
constitute wealth under the narrower term capital. The classical economists, particularly 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo and their critic, Karl Marx, distinguished between 
capital and land.  According to their labor theory of value, labor creates value in 
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Figure 1: Annual time series of the ratio of wealth to national income, W/Y, dashed 
lines, and of productive capital (approximated by data on ‘other domestic capital’) 
to national income, K/Y, solid lines, for eight countries. For some series, data is only 
available from 1970. The data sources are in the data appendix. 
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is the quotient of the flow of profits and the stock of capital that capitalists have 
accumulated for production. 
A class of non-produced and hence non-accumulated assets of which there is a 
limited and scarce supply, called land, on the other hand, does not earn profits. 
Instead, owners of scarce land assets earn a rent thanks to their ability to exclude 
others via property rights from the free use of the land asset for production.9 
Conceptually, assets of land type are not limited to the domain of agricultural 
land. They may take the form of a river for electricity generation, oil reserves, housing 
for workers close to a factory, but also rights to financial or legal intermediation or 
patents.10 The unifying principle is that property rights exist that make a resource, 
which is used in production, scarce. 
Land asset owners appropriate part of the value created by labor with the aid of 
capital. Ostensibly in Piketty, a rise in the price of land and, consequently, a rising 
wealth-income ratio is interpreted as being caused by substitution of more land for 
labor. But following the classical economists, this does not imply that more land is 
harnessed for production – by definition land is scarce and limited. Rather, it implies 
that the price of land increases relative to the labor share. It is a consequence of a 
revaluation of scarce land, not an increase in its quantity. 
The reason why the price of land changes may instead be a change in the rate of 
 
 
9The credit of distinguishing rents from profits (and wages) systematically goes to Adam Smith, 
and he identified rent as arising from a monopoly on land (Smith 1904, book 1, chapter 11).  David 
Ricardo (1951, chapter 2) explained ‘differential rent’ as arising from different qualities of land in 
use, and Karl Marx analyzed the possibility of ‘absolute rent’ on all land assets regardless of quality 
if the sector is more labor intensive and so produces relatively more surplus value than other sectors, 
part of which can be appropriated by land owners (Marx 1991, in particular chapter 45). 
10Foley (2013) discusses modern manifestations of the old concept of rent in financial and infor- 
mation services. 
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return on produced assets. Land, like any other asset, can be sold on the market. Its 
market price (that goes into Piketty’s wealth) is determined by what rate of return it 
can earn. With competitive markets, land assets earn on average the rate of return 
that produced assets, that is productive capital, in the same risk class earn. The 
rate of return on land is expressed as 
 
 
rate of return = 
rent 
price of land 
 
 
however, the causal direction does not go from right to left. On the contrary, the rate 
of return on assets is determined by the return on productive capital, and the rent of 
land determined by its scarcity. Therefore, land is capitalized at a price that results 
from the ratio of the two and the price of land is the result of separately determined 
rent and rates of return. 
 
 
price of land = 
rent  
rate of return 
 
 
If the amount of land assets remains constant and the rate of return on productive 
capital falls, then the price of that land – its capitalization – must increase, so as 
to keep the rate of return on land equal to that on produced assets. Otherwise 
there would be an arbitrage opportunity. These increases are large, relative to the 
percentage change in the rate of return. A change in the rate of return from 11% 
to 10% induces a ten percent rise in the price at which land is capitalized, a change 
from 6% to 5% even a twenty percent increase. As a consequence, the value of land 
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increases, and so does a measure of wealth, which incorporates it. 
Although neoclassical economics has abandoned the labor theory of value, the 
concept of rent on scarce resources is widely used.11 The narrower definition of 
productive capital based on which economists have estimated the elasticity before 
Piketty, recognized the important distinction between capital that earns a profit and 
land that earns a rent, and focused on accumulated capital only. 
 
3.3 Elasticity Measurement Consequences 
 
One area where this theoretical reasoning applies is the residential property market, 
which is not only built on scarce land, but is additionally not used in production. 
Hence, for a significant part of wealth, therefore causality runs from the rate of return 
to its capitalization, according to the theory just laid out. This line of reasoning 
contradicts Piketty’s theory where large swings in the wealth measure are said to 
cause changes in the rate of profit. However, failure to distinguish land from capital 
may lead to inflated elasticity estimates. Since the elasticity of substitution is an 
increasing function of the rate of change in capital output ratio; wealth measures of 
capital that include land assets’s changes in their market valuation will tend to bias 
elasticity estimates upwards. 
Looking at the Piketty and Zucman data it seems that capital has increased 
enormously relative to income and labor, while the rate of return has only   fallen 
11Schumpeter 1954, p. 642. Neoclassical treatments of rent on land or scarce resources motivated 
by utility maximization considerations of scarce resource owners can be found in  textbooks  on 
resource economics, e.g. Fisher(1981) or Randall and Castle (1985). Randall and Castle also discuss 
‘capital gains on land’ when land assets of different quality exist and new land of lower quality is 
taken  up  for  production. 
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slightly. In reality part of it may be a revaluation of the capitalized land. As Figure 
1 above shows, the actual underlying productive capital may have changed little, 
which leads to the conjecture that the elasticity measure discussed in Piketty and 
Zucman’s paper is inflated. In the rest of this note I will compare empirical estimates 
of the elasticity of substitution using wealth and the other domestic capital measure 
as a proxy for productive capital. 
 
 
4 Estimating the Elasticity of Substitution: Method 
and Data 
Estimating the elasticity of substitution has a long tradition in econometrics, and 
while results are varying, a majority of existing estimates is below one.12. I have not 
found any existing estimates of the elasticity of substitution for the eight country 
Piketty and Zucman dataset. Consistently with their description of a growth model, I 
base my estimate on the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function 
with constant returns to scale and Hicks-neutral technical change. It admits the 
derivation of a linear relationship between the logarithm of the rate of return and 
the logarithm of the capital output ratio, where the slope of the fit can be interpreted 
as the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The derivation is in the 
12Table 1 in Le´on-Ledesma et al. (2010) list studies with estimates using aggregate data, Chirinko 
(2008) discusses specifically long-run estimates, and also lists firm level data estimates. Berndt 
(1983, ch 9), recounts the influence of the elasticity of substitution on the development of different 
types of production functions. 
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Mathematical Appendix. I estimate the two equations 
 
Wt log 
Xt 
Kt log 
Xt 
= −σW log(rt) + cW + Et (1) 
= −σK log(rt) + cK  + εt (2) 
 
for the wealth and the productive capital proxy measure, where σW or σK is the 
elasticity of substitution and r is the rate of return. c comprises constant factors 
that determine the wealth/income ratio, E and ε are error terms. 
Piketty discusses long run trends. While the data is scarce, I am applying 
standard techniques from other recent work on the long run value of the elasticity 
of substitution, that aim at controlling for cyclical variations, to find out what these 
estimates suggest for the Piketty Zucman data. Chirinko (2008) presents three 
methods of long-run trend estimation. The first assumes that the annual values 
in equations (1) and (2) are close to their long-run values, the second attempts a 
cointegration approach (if this relationship exists) adding lead and lag first difference 
terms, and the third method divides the period in two sections, takes the average 
values in each and calculates the rate of change between periods. The single rate 
of change between the two periods is then estimated in a cross section. The last 
approach is only applicable to a panel with a sufficiently large number of countries, 
which is not the case for the eight countries under consideration here. I will implement 
the first two approaches below. 
The estimation requires data series for wealth, W , productive capital, K, output, 
X, and the rate of return on capital r.  Data for W is the capital series used by 
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Piketty, which I call wealth here. K is approximated by his ‘Other domestic capital’ 
series, which excludes housing wealth. The data series for both definitions of capital 
for the US are available for 1960-2010, for the seven other countries for 1970-2010, 
limiting the time series to 51 observations for the US and 41 for all others. While 
these annual series are short, they also correspond to the time period during which 
Piketty claims the elasticity may have been higher than before. With X the ‘net 
national income’ series used by Piketty, this yields the two time series W/X, K/X. 
I will use Piketty’s ‘capital share excluding government interest earned’ series that 
is also used by Piketty (2014, technical appendix p. 36), and label it α following 
his notation. Then, like in Piketty, the rate of return on weatlh is computed by 
multiplying W/X by the share of capital incomes, r =  α. 
The precise data sources are in the Data Appendix. The data are problematic. 
First, they are in nominal terms. Hence, changes in the capital/output ratio may be 
distorted due to differently changing price indices. Absent price deflators for any of 
the capital time series, I am using the available data. Second, they are in net terms. 
For Britain, gross data is available, and I use it to compare results. Third, there 
is no data to proxy technical change. The data can hardly be used for estimating 
results comparable with previous estimates. However, the estimates that use only 
the data available with Piketty and Zucman can be used to check the consistency of 
their claims with their own data. 
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5 Discussion of Results 
 
The log-log plots in Figures 2 and 3 plot all data for each of the eight countries. The 
rate of return to wealth is on the x-axes, the wealth income and productive capital 
income ratios on the y-axes. Dots show data using wealth, and circles data using the 
productive capital proxy. The x-axis scale varies from plot to plot, the y-axis scale is 
the same throughout for comparison, except for Japan, which has some data points 
with W/X > 7. The wealth data are above the productive capital data due to their 
larger numerator. The wealth data is also more tilted, as was expected due to the 
larger changes in the wealth output ratio discussed above. 
18 
Figure  2:   Scatter  of  annual  observations  of  wealth-income  (disks)  and  productive 
capital-income  (circles)  ratios  against  the  rate  of  return,  and  linear  fits.   Scales  on 
both axes are logarithmic. 
 
 
 
UK, 1970−2010 US, 1960−2010 
 
 
 
0.040 0.045 0.050    0.055   0.060 0.070 
 
France, 1970−2010 
0.045 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.065 0.070 
 
Germany, 1970−2010 
 
 
 
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Rate of return, r 
0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Rate of return, r 
● ● 
●      ●  ●●  ● ● 
● 
● 
●  ● 
● ● 
●    ●    ●   ● ● ● 
● ●        ●●● 
●  ●  ●  
● 
●    ● ●   ● ● ● ● ● ● σ    = −0.28 W 
●●      ●  ●●   ●● ●●   ● 
● ●● 
●●●●● ●● ●● ●●  ●   ●●●● ● 
●   
● 
● 
 ●   
● 
σK = 0.33 
● 
●● 
●●  ● 
● 
● σW = 0.52 
● 
● 
● 
● 
●● 
●   ● ●   ●● ●   
● 
● 
●    ●●● ● ●    
● ● ● ● ●  
●●    ● ●  ●●● 
●●    ● 
● 
● σK = 0.25 
    ● 
●   ● 
●● ● ● ●
● 
● 
● 
  ●●     ● 
● ●●  ●   ●   ●●  
● ●●
●      ● ● 
● 
●●  ● ● 
(Both axes in all plots on logarithmic scale) 
● 
●  ● 
● 
● 
● 
●  ●    ● 
●  
● 
σW = 0.51 
● 
● ● ● 
● ● ●
●●    ●  ●●●  ● ● 
● ● ● 
●● ● ● ● 
 ●   ●● ● ●       ● ●  ● ●  ● ● ● ●    
 
 
 
 
● ● ● ● ● 
● 
●● 
●● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● ● 
● ●  ● 
       ●   
● ●  ● 
●● 
●●● ●● 
●   ●●●●      ●●   
●   ● ● 
● 
● 
●   ● 
● 
● 
●    ● 
σK = 0.41 
σW = 0.33 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
●● ● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● 
● ● 
● 
● ● 
●● 
● 
● 
● ● 
●● 
● 
● 
● ● 
● 
● 
● 
● ● 
● 
  ●     ● 
● ● ●● ● 
● 
● 
● 
●     ● 
● 
● 
●  
●● 
●●●   ●   
●
● ● 
● 
●● ● ●● 
● 
● 
●   ● 
σK = 0.08 
● 
Legend for all plots: 
RoR (r) vs. Wealth /income ratio (W/X) 
● RoR vs. Prod. Capital /income ratio (K/X) 
Linear Fit W: log(W  X) = − σW log(r) + c 
    Linear Fit K: log(K  X) = − σK log(r) + c 
W
/X
 a
nd
 K
/X
 
W
/X
 a
nd
 K
/X
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
19 
Figure  3:   Scatter  of  annual  observations  of  wealth-income  (disks)  and  productive 
capital-income  (circles)  ratios  against  the  rate  of  return,  and  linear  fits.   Scales  on 
both axes are logarithmic. 
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5.1 Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Figures 2 and 3 also plot linear fits, where the slope is the negative of the elasticity 
of substitution point estimate of an ordinary least squares (OLS) cross section 
regression. For wealth the σ point estimate is below one, often below 0.5, while 
Germany appears anomalous. For the productive capital estimate, the elasticity 
drops further everywhere except in Japan. Germany now shows a positive but small 
elasticity of substitution. Looking also at the standard errors of the estimates in 
Column 1 and 2 of Table 1 for wealth and productive capital, in spite of the small 
sample size the unit elasticity is outside and above the confidence interval of any 
of the estimates besides Italy. In fact, the lack of statistical significance of several 
estimates testifies to the elasticity being close to zero for several countries: Australia, 
Canada and the UK. 
Matt Rognlie (2014) offers an explanation for these surprisingly low elasticities, 
by highlighting that Piketty’s discussion is in net of depreciation terms and that for 
net quantities the elasticity of substitution is lower than for gross quantities, since 
the depreciation is paid for out of profits and not labor income. The ‘Gross vs. Net 
Appendix’ at the very end of the document illustrates Rognlie’s logical argument at 
the example of Britain, which generates a higher σ estimate when using gross output 
and capital share. Yet, precisely because the discussion is about net quantities, the 
results discussed here are the ones of interest that check Piketty’s theory. 
As is usual with time series data, however, there is significant serial correlation. 
The Durbin-Watson test rejects the null of no serial correlation for every single series. 
The OLS estimate is inefficient. While first-differencing is a less helpful remedy as 
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j=1 
 
it removes long-run information in the data, generalized least squares (GLS) can 
theoretically correct for serial  correlation. 
 
5.2 Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
 
Since the autocorrelation structure is unknown, the elasticity has to be estimated 
using feasible GLS (FGLS). Following Antras (2004), I regress the residuals of the 
estimates on up to their first four lags, that is Et =  
),J
 Et− j + νt, J = 1, 2, 3, 4, to 
 
check whether the error term ν is white noise. I stop when Ljung-Box tests with one 
to five lags cannot reject the null hypothesis of the error term, ν being white noise 
at the five percent confidence level in at least four of the five test specifications. 
Most FGLS regressions admit of an AR(1) structure but some are AR(2).13 The 
results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1. The elasticity estimates for 
the wealth series drop dramatically in every series; yet they are all significant due 
to lower standard deviations of the estimator. The picture is more mixed for the 
productive capital proxy, as some estimates rise, others fall. The ones that rise, 
however, are those where the OLS estimate could not reject the hypothesis of zero 
elasticity. In the FGLS estimate, every single elasticity is signficantly different both 
zero and one, and all but one estimate are below 0.5. While these estimates are 
subject to the data caveats above as well as the very small sample size, they do 
not support Piketty’s hypothesis of an elasticity significantly greater than one.  It 
13Those which use an AR(2) autocorrelation structure are both US regressions, the French wealth 
regression, and the German, Australian and Italian productive capital regressions. The German 
productive capital series only reports white noise with a surprising AR(4) structure. The UK 
wealth series suggests an AR(2) correlation structure, however the restricted maximum likelihood 
algorithm does not converge, so I estimate a compromise AR(1) instead. The computations are 
done using the R function gls() in the nmle package. 
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Table 1: Estimates 
 Col 1 
OLSW 
Col 2 
OLSK 
Col 3 
FGLSW 
Col 4 
FGLSK  
Col 5 
CIW 
Col 6 
CIK 
UK 0.3344 0.0779 0.2031 ** 0.2364 **   
 (0.2049) (0.0961) (0.0616) (0.0735)   
US 0.5138 ** 
(0.1044) 
0.4055 * 
(0.1684) 
0.3573 ** 
(0.0631) 
0.3877 ** 
(0.0894) 
  
FR 0.5177 ** 
(0.09625) 
0.2522 ** 
(0.07968) 
0.1767 ** 
(0.0427) 
0.1568 ** 
(0.0739) 
 0.2035 * 
(0.0824) 
DE -0.2831 * 0.3282 ** 0.1598 ** 0.2250 ** -0.4273 ** 0.2818 ** 
 (0.1096) (0.0486) (0.0409) (0.0522) (0.0989) (0.0565) 
AU 0.5859 ** 0.0187 0.2622 ** 0.2808 **  -0.3173 
 (0.1672) (0.1564) (0.0407) (0.0390)  (0.2123) 
CA 0.4719 ** 0.1307 0.2086 ** 0.1780 **  -0.0455 
 (0.1575) (0.0792) (0.0432) (0.0621)  (0.1290) 
JP 0.8532 ** 0.8985 ** 0.4884 ** 0.4116 ** 0.9240 ** 0.9560 ** 
 (0.0551) 0.0684 (0.0731) (0.0684) (0.0608) (0.0783) 
IT 1.1597 ** 0.9910 ** 0.5550 ** 0.3033 ** 1.3830 ** 1.2764 ** 
 (0.0747) (0.1073) (0.0438) (0.0708) (0.0826) (0.1147) 
** significant at the 99% confidence level. 
*  significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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remains to be seen whether series are non-stationary and the regressions spurious or 
additionally cointegrated, and therefore permit using the other method of estimating 
the long-run elasticity discussed in Chirinko (2008). 
 
5.3 Cointegration 
 
The OLS and GLS results may be spurious if the time series used have a stochastic 
trend. To test for unit roots, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with one and two lags 
are run on each of the three time series for every country. For every series but that 
of the UK rate of return, at least one specification cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the series is integrated of order one. Applying the Engle Granger (1987) approach, a 
further Dickey-Fuller test using the MacKinnon (1996) critical values on the residuals 
of the OLS regressors reveals that for about half of the series the errors are stationary. 
For these, the OLS estimate is therefore that of a long-run relationship, while for the 
others the hypothesis of a spurious regression cannot be rejected. Following Chirinko 
(2008), adding lags and leads of the differences of the logarithm of the rate of return 
to equations (1) and (2) controls for deviations of observed values from the long-run 
unobserved ones that distort the long-run elasticity estimate. In light of the small 
data sample, only leads were added.14 This reflects Piketty and Zucman’s theoretical 
presumption that changes in the input ratios impact the rate of profit, and that this 
may happen with a lag. Hence, adding leads can be interpreted as controlling for 
multiyear fluctuations in the rate of profit and highlighting instead the longer-term 
response in returns to a change in the capital labor (and capital output) ratio. 
14Adding leads instead lags or a combination of both did not produced similar results. 
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Estimates with three leads are reported for those regressions where a cointegration 
relationship was detected in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1. While estimates for France 
and Germany in the productive capital series are smaller than their cointegrated OLS 
estimates, all four estimates for Japan and Italy increase. For Japan, the hypothesis 
of a Cobb-Douglas specification cannot be rejected, and the estimates for Italy are 
significantly above unit elasticity. These results suggest that at least for a few series 
there are long-run stationary relationships, all but one of which result in estimates 
of the elasticity of substitution that are below or not above unit elasticity, again 
countervailing  Piketty’s hypothesis. 
All of the results should be interpreted with great caution. First, there is the small 
sample size. Then the counterintuitive negative parameters both in the German 
estimates across columns and (insignificant) Canadian and Australian estimates 
in the cointegration column 6, suggest that the capital output ratio and rate of 
return may be linked in complicated ways over time, whereby an elasticity with 
the ‘right’ sign may only occur between observations several years away from each 
other. While the cointegration estimates with leads go some way towards controlling 
for the cyclical component in rates of return, it may fail to capture intertemporal 
feedback between the series due to technical change. Changes in capital intensity 
may influence the rate of return with a lag, but conversely the rate of return and 
its influence on the capital share may have a repercussion on subsequent changes in 
capital intensity, what is known as induced technical change (Kennedy 1964). The 
endogeneity problem that this poses for a regression analysis may bias the results in 
either direction (Antras 2004), making it hard to judge in whether elasticity estimates 
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may be over or underestimated. 
Yet, with these caveats noted, nothing in the results suggests that an appropriate 
range for σ is between 1.3 and 1.6, as claimed  by  Piketty.  On the contrary,  the 
low estimates reported here for his own data and idiosyncratic definition of capital 
that is expected to produce higher elasticity estimates than the standard productive 
capital measure, suggests that his prediction of how capital shares will evolve must 
be treated with suspicion. Since Piketty’s claim of a high elasticity goes against 
most previous evidence, he would need to have particularly clear results of above 
unit elasticity. But the foregoing analysis indicates that it would be very difficult to 
obtain such clear cut results. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Thomas Piketty’s empirical and analytical brilliance in his sweeping history of income 
and wealth inequality at the micro-level is remarkable. However, his elasticity of 
substitution theory of a rising capital share relying on a ‘wealth’ measure of capital 
at the macro-level is both theoretically and empirically unconvincing. In light of 
the theory of rent, some of the changes in his wealth measure that he conflates with 
capital are likely to reflect revaluations in the capitalization of assets of land type. 
These, rather than reflecting additional capital employed in production, are caused 
by changes in the rate of return itself and may overstate not only the rise in the 
capital output ratio but also estimates of the elasticity of substitution. Empirically, 
even if one uses wealth instead of a standard capital definition for the capital/income 
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ratio and thus risks inflating elasticity estimates, his own dataset does not support an 
above unit elasticity. Ridding the capital measure from housing assets further adds 
to the evidence against a high elasticity. While the econometric estimates are not 
conclusive for settling on any particular elasticity values, Piketty will need to produce 
better evidence for his theory to be covincing. In the meantime, other macroeconomic 
arguments that do not rely on a technogical ‘production function’ explanation – such 
as advanced in Rowthorn (2014), Taylor (2014) and Barbosa-Filho (2016) – will be 
needed to grapple with the rising capital share and the inequality it implies. It is to 
Piketty’s great credit that he has fueled the debate about this pressing issue. 
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Data Appendix 
 
The data series in Table 2 are taken from http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capitalisback 
. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sources files for data series used 
 
 
 
 
For the UK gross computations I used gross national income as well as the sums 
of components of gross wealth and profit shares that are tabulated in UK.xls in the 
sheets DataUK1 and DataUK3. 
Wealth/Net Income (W/X) 
Capital/Net Income (K/X) 
Net Capital Share excl.  gov’t interest α 
AppendixTables.xls sheet Table A1 
AppendixTables.xls sheet Table A22 
[country].xls sheet Table 11a 
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Mathematical Appendix: Deriving the Equation 
for Estimation 
The equation to be estimated can be derived both from a CES production function 
Assuming with Piketty that output, X, comes from a CES production function with 
inputs K and L, and the elasticity of substitution, σ, the CES functional form is 
 
σ−1 
 
 
σ−1 
 
   σ   
σ−1 
X = d(ρK) σ    + (1 − d)(ξL) σ       
Ω
    (A.1) 
 
where d ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution parameter that determines the relative importance 
of each factor in production and ρ and ξ are productivities. Assuming that factors 
are remunerated equal to their marginal products, the remuneration of capital or 
rate of return, r, is 
 
∂X  
= 
((
[Ω] 
σ 1 σ
 
∂K 
 
dρ(ρK) 
 
σ −1 
σ   − (A.2) 
1 −1 
= X σ  dρ(ρK) σ (A.3) 
−1 
σ−1 K σ 
r = dρ σ    
X 
(A.4) 
 
Writing the marginal product in terms of K/X this gives 
 
K 
 
r 
= σ   1 X dρ 
−
 
 −σ  
(A.5) 
 
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Taking  logarithms gives 
 
K 
log 
X 
= −σ log(r) − σ log(d) − (1 − σ)log(ρ) (A.6) 
 
This expression can be estimated as 
 
K 
log 
X 
= −σ log(r) + c + ε (A.7) 
 
where c the constant part of the remaining terms and ε are possible technology 
shocks to capital productivity, ρ and to the distribution parameter d. In the case of 
Hicks-neutral technical change there is a restriction on the technical change parameters 
that ρ = ξ, which can then be collected into the technical change parameter A. 
 
 
Gross vs.  Net Appendix 
 
Figure 4 shows two plots with pairs of rate of return and the wealth national income 
(dots) and productive capital national income (circles) ratio for the UK for 1970-2010 
and linear fits estimated as in the text body. The left plot displays net national 
income and the net rate of return, the right plot displays gross national income and 
gross rate of return. As above, the slopes of the regression lines are the elasticity of 
substitution estimates times minus one. Gross elasticities are higher than their net 
counterparts. 
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Figure 4: Scatter of annual observations of wealth-income (disks) and productive 
capital-income (cirlces) ratios against the rate of return, and linear fits for the United 
Kingdom. The left panel shows wealth and productive capital net of depreciation, 
the right panel gross of depreciation. 
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Legend for both plots: 
RoR (r) vs. Wealth /income ratio (W/X) 
● RoR vs. Prod. Capital /income ratio (K/X) 
           Linear Fit W: log(W  X) = − σW log(r) + c 
Linear Fit K: log(K  X) = − σK log(r) + c 
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